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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

5 78A-4-103(2)(j), as this

matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third
District Court (R. 41 1-12,l Addendum Exhibit 1.) The appeal was transferred by the
Utah Supreme Court to this Court. (R. 34-35 (Case 2321).)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court incorrectly exercised its authority in: (a) denying

the motion filed by RespondentIAppellant UBS Financial Services Inc. ("UBS") for summary confirmation of a certain arbitration award (the "Award) that was entered in favor
of UBS by the three-member arbitration panel duly appointed by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA) and agreed upon by both parties; and (b) granting the
motion to vacate the Award filed by PetitionerIAppellee Thomas G. Hicks, I11 ("Hicks")
on the sole basis that the trial court disagreed with the arbitrators' decision not to grant
Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records. UBS addressed this issue below in
its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration Award and supporting
memorandum. (Memorandum Supporting UBS's Motion for Summary Confirmation, R.
96- 122.)

1

This appeal is taken from two consolidated actions: Third District Court Cases
08090 1999 (" 1999") and 08090232 1 ("232 1"). When the district court numbered the
record, the court started at page 1 in each file. Therefore, the record page numbers
overlap. (For example, there are two distinct pages in the record bearing the number 10.)
Because the record for Case 2321 contains only 36 pages and the vast majority of the
record citations in this brief refer to the record from Case 1999, the few citations to Case
232 1 are expressly noted in the text.

In reviewing a trial court's order confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration
award, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law.
More specifically, the appellate court's "scope of review is limited to the legal issue of
whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award." Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT
46, 7 12, 1 P.3d 1095 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
78B-11-118. Witnesses -- Subpoenas -- Depositions -- Discovery.

An arbitrator may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is appropriate
(3)
in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the proceeding fair,
expeditious, and cost-effective.
78B-11-124. Vacating an award.
Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court
(I)
shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if
(a)

the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

(b)

there was:

(i)
arbitrator;
(ii)

evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral

corruption by an arbitrator; or

(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party
to the arbitration proceeding;
an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of suf(c)
ficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B- 11-116, so
as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;

(d)

an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority;

there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in
(e)
the arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation
(f)
of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
78B-11-116. Arbitration process.

An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in a manner the arbitrator
(I)
considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding. The
authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power to hold conferences
with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the hearing and, among other
matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any
evidence.

At a hearing under Subsection (3), a party to the arbitration pro(4)
ceeding has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy,
and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from the trial court's decision to vacate an arbitration award
unanimously entered by a three-member panel appointed by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority on the sole basis that the arbitrators purportedly denied Hicks
certain discovery.
On July 14, 2006, UBS filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA to recover the
amounts due and owing on certain loans that Hicks had failed and refused to repay.

(Statement of Claim, R. 189-246.) Hicks had previously agreed to arbitrate any and all
disputes with UBS and, in so doing, acknowledged in writing that his ability to conduct
depositions and obtain other discovery would be more limited in arbitration than in court
proceedings.

(See Forms U-413080, Add. Ex. 2, R. 142-61, especially R. 150,15, and R.

1607 14)
On September 7, 2006, Hicks, by and through his counsel, filed an answer with
FINRA containing, among other things, counterclaims for allegedly unpaid investment
banking referral fees. (Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of Counterclaim, R.
248-56.) Hicks also filed a uniform submission agreement in which he voluntarily
submitted the entire controversy to arbitration, consented to FINRA7s rules and
procedures, including its discovery rules, and agreed to abide by and perform any awards
rendered by the arbitration panel. (Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, R. 258-59.)
Following a year and a half of proceedings, including extensive and protracted discovery, the arbitrators conducted the evidentiary hearing in Salt Lake City on November 6,
7 and 8, 2007.

(See Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, R. 329.) The arbitrators awarded UBS

the sum of $647,362.56, representing the full principal amount due and owing on the EFLs
plus interest, and awarded Hicks the principal sum of $161,128, representing certain
investment banking referral fees.2

2

(aat R. 324-3 1.)

The arbitrators initially issued the Award on or about November 15, 2007. On or
about January 4, 2008, the arbitrators issued an Amended Award that included a
provision setting off the amounts it awarded to UBS by the amounts that it awarded to
Hicks. (Add. Ex. 4.)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On February 4, 2008, Hicks filed a petition and motion to vacate the ward.)
Meanwhile, on February 8, 2008, unaware that Hicks had filed a motion to vacate, UBS
filed a separate petition to confirm the Award. (R. 1-12 (Case 2321).) The two matters
were consolidated before the Honorable Judge Robert P. Faust. On April 8, 2008, UBS
filed its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration Award. (R. 96- 122.)
After the trial court heard oral argument on June 13, 2008, it issued a Memorandum Decision, dated July 8, 2008, in which it denied UBS's motion for summary
confirmation of the Award and granted Hicks' petition to vacate the Award. (Memorandum Decision, Add. Ex. 5, R. 372-76.) On September 30, 2008, the trial court entered
a final order stating that Hicks "was denied critical discovery; denied the opportunity to
present material evidence; and denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine
witnesses, all of which substantially prejudiced Hicks' rights during the arbitration
proceeding." (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 1, R. 411-12.) The trial court never
specifically identified any discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied. (See id.)
On October 24, 2008, UBS filed a Notice of Appeal indicating that it was appealing both the trial court's decision denying UBS's motion for summary confirmation
and the trial c o ~ r t ' sfinal order and judgment vacating the Award. (R. 4 13- 15.)

3

Hicks' initial Petition and Motion are not in the appellate record, though they
appear on the district court docket report for Case 1999. Hicks' Amended Petition and
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award appears at R. 6-2 1.

Statement of Facts
A.

The FINRA Arbitration Process

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA), acting under the supervision of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, is the largest nongovernmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United ~ t a t e s .(
~t&
generally www.finra.org.) In fact, FINRA oversees over 5,000 brokerage firms, approximately

172,000 branch offices and more than 676,000 registered securities

representatives.

(Id.) FINRA also operates the largest securities dispute resolution forum

in the world, the purpose of which is to efficiently and expeditiously resolve employment, business and investment disputes related to the securities industry. (See generally

http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm.) FINRA recruits, trains and manages large rosters of neutral arbitrators selected from a diverse cross-section of professionals with knowledge and experience in the securities industry.

(Id.)

In accordance with the legislatively-enacted FINRA arbitration process, discovery
is more limited in FINRA arbitration, thereby providing for the speedy and efficient
resolution of disputes. FINRA7s Code of Arbitration Procedure ("CAP") requires, for
example, that requests for documents and information must be "specific and relate to the
matter in controversy."

t& FINRA

CAP Rule 13506 (Add. Ex. 6). Requests for

information must be "limited to the identification of individuals, entities, and time
periods related to the dispute" and be "reasonable in number."

4

(NASD).

Id. Information requests

FINRA is the successor to the National Association of Securities Dealers

must not "require narrative answers or fact finding."
permitted.

Id. Standard interrogatories are not

Id.

Moreover, depositions are "strongly discouraged in FINRA arbitration.

See

FINRA CAP Rule 13510 (also included in Add. Ex. 6). The arbitrators may permit
depositions only in the following "very limited circumstances:
To preserve the testimony of ill or dying witnesses;
To accommodate essential witnesses who are unable or
unwilling to travel long distances for a hearing and may
not otherwise be required to participate in the hearing;
To expedite large or complex cases; and
If the panel determines that extraordinary circumstances
exist.

Id.
FINRA7s Arbitrator's Manual instructs the arbitrators to carefully exercise their
judgment when considering a party's request for depositions and cautions them to bear in
mind that arbitration should be efficient and expeditious:
The effective use of discovery tools such as depositions rests
in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care
should be taken to avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to
the parties and to avoid unnecessary delay.
See The Arbitrator's Manual, August 2007, at p. 12 (Add. Ex. 7).
B.

The Parties' Arbitration Agreement

On or about September 14, 2000, UBS hired Hicks as a Financial Advisor in its
Salt Lake City, Utah branch office. (Declaration of Thomas G. Hicks, 111, 7 2, R. 23.) In
connection with his hiring, Hicks executed a Form U-4, in which he agreed "to arbitrate

any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . . . that is
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the [self regulatory
organizations, including the NASD] indicated in item 11 . . . ." (Add. Ex. 2 at R. 150.)
At or around the same time, Hicks executed a Form 3080, in which he
acknowledged that discovery is more limited in arbitration and that he would have only a
very limited ability to have a court vacate an arbitration award:
Arbitration awards are generally final and binding; a party's
ability to have a court reverse or modify an arbitration award
is very limited.

The ability of the parties to obtain documents, witness
statements and other discovery is generally more limited in
arbitration than in court proceedings.
(Add. Ex. 2 at R. 161 (emphasis added).)
C.

The Commencement of the Arbitration

UBS advanced two Employee Forgivable Loans ("EFLs"), totaling over $1.2
million, to Hicks over the course of his employment with UBS.

(See Promissory Notes,

R. 163-81.) Each EFL was memorialized in a promissory note, which provided, among
other things, that the EFLs were to be forgiven in equal annual installments for as long as
Hicks remained employed by UBS.

(Id.at R. 163, 173.)

Each note also provided that, if

Hicks' employment with UBS were terminated, whether voluntarily or involuntarily
(other than by reason of disability or death), all unforgiven amounts shall immediately
become immediately due and payable.

(Id.)

On February 27, 2006, Hicks resigned from UBS and joined Morgan Stanley.
(Hicks Decl.

7 6,

R. 24.) At the time, Hicks owed UBS the net principal balance of

$647,362.56 on the EFLs. (See id.

7 7.)

Although he resigned from UBS to join a

competitor firm, Hicks failed and refused to repay the loans to UBS. (% Statement of
Claim, R. 189-95.) Per the parties' arbitration agreement, UBS filed its Statement of
Claim with FINRA seeking to recover the amounts due and owing on the EFLs.

(Id.)

In response, Hicks, who was at all times represented by counsel, filed an answer
with FINRA containing, among other things, counterclaims for allegedly unpaid investment banking referral fees.

(% Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of

Counterclaim at R. 25 1-59.) Specifically, Hicks claimed that he had referred two investment banking clients to UBS: Extra Space Storage and Infinite Energy. (Id) Hicks
sought referral fees in addition to those that UBS had already paid him with respect to
transactions involving UBS and Extra Space Storage.

(Id.) Hicks also sought referral

fees in connection with a purported transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy, for
which UBS had declined to pay Hicks any referral fees because that transaction was
never completed.

(Id.; see also Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8, at 7 7, R. 290.)

Hicks also filed a uniform submission agreement in which he voluntarily submitted the entire controversy (including his counterclaims) to arbitration, consented to
FINRA7srules and procedures, including its limited discovery rules, and agreed to abide
by and perform any awards rendered by the arbitration panel:
The undersigned parties hereby submit the present matter in
controversy, as set forth in the attached Statement of Claim,
answers, and all related counterclaims and/or third party
claims which may be asserted, to arbitration in accordance
with the Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations, and/or
Code of Arbitration Procedure of the sponsoring organization.

The undersigned parties further agree to abide by and
perform any award(s) rendered pursuant to this Submission
Agreement and further agree that a judgment, and any interest
due thereon, may be entered upon such award(s) and, for
these purposes, the undersigned party hereby voluntarily consents to submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction which may properly enter such judgment.
(See Uniform Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, at 7 4, R. 258 (emphasis added).)
FINRA appointed an arbitration panel consisting of three attorneys who were
highly qualified and had expertise in the securities industry. (See Amended Award, Add.
Ex. 4, R. 330.) Both parties, including Hicks, agreed to and confirmed the three-member
arbitration panel. (See Scheduling Order, R. 26 1; see generally Amended Award, R. 324-

Hicks, who was represented by counsel in connection with the arbitration
throughout its pendency, voluntarily and fully participated in the arbitration and never
claimed that his counterclaim should be litigated in a court of law, never requested that
the arbitration panel grant him leave to file his counterclaim in court and never applied to
any court for a stay of the arbitration or for a ruling that his counterclaim was not subject
to arbitration. (See Answer, R. 248-56; Uniform Submission Agreement, Add. Ex. 3, R.
258-59; Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, R. 324-3 1.)
D.

Discovery in the Arbitration

Although Hicks now claims that he was denied the ability to conduct discovery in
the arbitration, that contention is entirely unsupported and belied by the record. In fact,
despite the more limited nature of discovery in FINRA arbitration, the arbitrators went to

great lengths in providing Hicks with the ability to conduct the type of discovery not
typically permitted in arbitration.
For example, in his counterclaim, Hicks alleged that David Reynolds, a former
UBS employee whom UBS did not identify as someone having relevant knowledge
related to the case, assured Hicks that he would receive "a close to seven figure commission" for referring an investment banking client to UBS.

(See R. 253, 7 5.) In

support of his request that the arbitrators grant him the ability to depose Mr. Reynolds,
Hicks contended that Mr. Reynolds had information crucial to his claims and that,
because Mr. Reynolds was no longer employed by UBS and not identified as a potential
witness, he would have no other recourse to obtain that information. (Respondent's
Request for Depositions at R. 272-73.) Although depositions are "strongly discouraged
in FINRA arbitration, the arbitrators granted Hicks' request after considering the parties'
briefs and oral argument. (Discovery Order, March 29, 2007, R. 277-79.) After Hicks'
lawyers contacted Mr. Reynolds and realized that his testimony might not be helpful, and
in fact might be detrimental, to his case, Hicks never deposed Mr. Reynolds. (Affidavit
of David L. Reynolds at R. 283.)
The arbitrators also provided Hicks with the very information which he now
claims was denied. Although the arbitrators denied Hicks' request to depose UBS7s
custodian of records after the issue was fully briefed by the parties and heard by the
arbitrators at a hearing, they provided Hicks with the information he sought by other
means. Specifically, the arbitrators ordered UBS to provide a sworn affirmation stating
either that "there are no responsive documents or information" in response to Hicks'

discovery requests or that UBS's "previously produced documents or information (which
shall be itemized by name or description) constitute all the responsive documents or
information that was found after the required good faith search."

(Order re Cross

Motions on Discovery, October 18, 2007, R. 285-86.)
Accordingly, UBS produced an Affirmation detailing its efforts to search for and
retrieve documents and information responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, identifying
each category of documents that UBS produced as a result of its search and stating that
such documents constitute all of the responsive documents that were found after the
required good faith search. (Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8.)
Further dispelling any notion that Hicks, as he claimed in support of his motion to
vacate, was not granted access to the information he requested, the arbitrators ordered all
of UBS's witnesses

-

including Virginia Weisman, who conducted UBS's search for

documents and executed the Affirmation

-

to appear for testimony at the evidentiary

hearing and to have with them all documents "in their custody or to which they have
access" pertaining to Hicks' counterclaims. (Discovery Order, at R. 278.) Accordingly,
all of UBS's witnesses appeared at and testified the evidentiary hearing, or were made
available to appear and testify to the extent that Hicks wanted to examine them, and
brought with them all of the documents they had relating to Hicks' counterclaims.
(Affidavit of Anthony J. Borrelli 7 3 1, R. 137.) In fact, Hicks presented the testimony of
Ms. Weisman as part of his case in chief and examined her regarding both UBS's
document production as well as the purported transaction between UBS and Infinite
Energy that was never completed.

(Id.7 32.)

In addition, in response to Hicks' requests, the arbitrators empowered Hicks to
issue subpoenas upon the two companies, Infinite Energy and Extra Space Storage, that
he claimed he referred to UBS.

(Id. 7

25, R. 136.) The only document that Hicks

obtained in response to his subpoenas was an apparent term loan facility commitment
letter, dated September 19, 2005, relating to the purported transaction between UBS and
Infinite Energy.

(Id. 7 26.)

Hicks did not obtain any documents showing that the

transaction was ever completed or that UBS earned any fees from it.
E.

(Id.)

The Evidentiary Hearing

Hicks never claimed that he did not have sufficient time to prepare for the
evidentiary hearing. In fact, over the course of the prior eighteen months, the threemember arbitration panel ordered that the evidentiary hearing be scheduled and then postponed for six months in response to Hicks' requests and to accommodate Hicks' claimed
need to conduct additional discovery.

(See Scheduling Order, R, 261-63; Order

Rescheduling Evidentiary Hearing, R. 269-270.)
Although Hicks' primary argument in support of his motion to vacate the Award
was that he was unable to depose UBS's custodian of records, he failed to disclose that
Virginia Weisman, the person who conducted UBS's search for documents and executed
the Affirmation, appeared and testified at the evidentiary hearing. (Borrelli Aff. 7 32, R.
137; Affirmation, Add. Ex. 8, R. 288-90.)

In fact, Hicks presented her testimony

regarding Hicks' counterclaim for alleged unpaid investment banking fees as part of his
case-in-chief. (Borrelli Aff.

7 32, R.

137.) Among other things, Ms. Weisman testified

as to the reasons why the purported term loan facility transaction between UBS and

Infinite Energy was never completed. (See id.; see also Affirmation at R. 290) Ms.
Weisman also gave testimony, in response to questioning by Hicks' counsel, regarding
UBS's document production. (See id.; see generally Affirmation.)
Hicks, on the other hand, testified that he had no knowledge whatsoever regarding
the purported term loan facility transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy. (Borrelli
Aff. 7 36, R. 138.) Despite having been granted subpoena power by the arbitration panel,
Hicks did not present any testimony, sworn affirmations or other evidence from any
witnesses associated with either Infinite Energy or Extra Space Storage at the evidentiary
hearing.

(Id.77 37-38.)

Accordingly, as UBS repeatedly stated to Hicks throughout the arbitration proceeding, it was and remains to this day undisputed that there was no transaction between

UBS and InJinite Energy and that, therefore, Hicks is not entitled to any investment
banking referral fees. (Affirmation 7 7, R. 290; Letters to Hicks' Counsel at R. 3 11 and

R. 3 13; Letter to FINRA at R. 3 18.)
Although Hicks may claim that UBS failed to produce the commitment letter

-

which, per UBS's sworn Affirmation and Ms. Weisman's testimony, it did not have in its
possession

-

the fact remains that Hicks obtained it in advance of the final hearing,

moved it into evidence and had the opportunity to question any of UBS's witnesses about
it. (Borrelli Aff. 7 27, R. 136.) Hicks also obtained UBS's Affirmation in advance of the
final hearing, moved it into evidence and had the opportunity to question any of UBS's
witnesses about it.

(Id.7 21, R. 135.)

The arbitrators heard Hicks' testimony, Ms. Weisman's testimony as well as the
testimony of all of the other witnesses, assessed their credibility and reviewed all of the
other evidence, including the Affirmation and the purported commitment letter.
(Amended Award, Add. Ex. 4, at R. 327.) The trial court, on the other hand, did none of
these things.
F.

The Award

The arbitrators awarded certain amounts to both UBS and Hicks.

(Id.)

Specifically, the arbitrators awarded UBS the full principal amount owed on the EFLs
plus interest, totaling $647,362.56.

(Id.) The arbitrators awarded Hicks the sum of

$161,128, representing additional investment banking fees with respect to transactions
involving UBS and Extra Space Storage.

(Id.) The arbitrators set off the amount

awarded to UBS by the amount awarded to Hicks, yielding a net result of an Award in
favor of UBS in the amount of $575,436.28 (as of February 8, 2008).

(Id.at R. 328; see

Borrelli Aff. 7 43, R. 138.)
The arbitrators did not award Hicks any amounts in connection with the purported
transaction between UBS and Infinite Energy that, as shown by the undisputed evidence
adduced at the evidentiary hearing, was never completed. (Amended Award at R. 327.)

G.

The Trial Court Vacated The Award

Instead of satisfying the Award, Hicks filed a motion to vacate the entire Award including the amounts that UBS was awarded, which Hicks has never disputed - on the
basis that the arbitrators purportedly denied his requests for two discovery items: (I) the
deposition of UBS7s custodian of records; and (2) certain metadata relating to a

Powerpoint presentation regarding UBS's investment banking referral fee policy. (Mem.
Supp. Amended Pet. and Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, R. 8-2 1.)
On April 8, 2008, UBS filed its Motion for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration
Award, arguing that (I) a trial court's potential disagreement with the arbitrators' denial
of a party's discovery request is not a legally permissible reason for vacating an
arbitration award, and (2) even if it were, the arbitrators resolved the purported discovery
"issue" in this case by providing Hicks with the information he sought by alternate
means. (Mem. Supp. UBS's Mot. for Summ. Conf. of Arbitration Award, R. 99- 121.)
UBS also pointed out that, while Hicks claimed that he was "unjustly denied access to
the metadata, he had never even raised that issue to the arbitrators and they had never
ruled upon it.

(Id.at R. 120-21; see also Borrelli Aff. 7 29, R. 137.)

After the trial court heard oral argument on June 13, 2008, it issued a Memorandum Decision, dated July 8, 2008, in which it denied UBS's motion for summary
confirmation of the Award, granted Hicks' petition to vacate the Award and instructed
Hicks' counsel to prepare a final order that "should specifically outline the discovery
which was denied to [Hicks] and explain the basis for the Court's decision that [Hicks]
was denied the opportunity to present material evidence." (Memorandum Decision, Add.
Ex. 5, at R. 375.)
Hicks, however, submitted a proposed final order that neither specifically outlined
the discovery he was purportedly denied nor explained the basis for the trial court's decision that he was denied the opportunity to present material evidence. ([Proposed] Order
and Judgment, Add. Ex. 9, R. 385-89.) Instead, Hicks submitted a proposed final order to

the trial court in which he raised five purported discovery items that he supposedly
requested in the arbitration and that the arbitrators supposedly denied him. (See id.)
Despite his representations to the trial court, however, Hicks never presented four of the
five discovery "issues" to the arbitrators and the arbitrators never ruled upon such
<<.

issues."

(Id.) As UBS pointed out in objecting to Hicks' final order, the only discovery

item that the arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of UBS7s custodian of records.

(See Objections to Proposed Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 10, R. 377-83.) In fact,
Hicks did not even raise most of these purported discovery "issues" in support of his
motion to vacate the Award. (See id.)
The trial court issued a Minute Entry on September 9, 2008 properly rejecting
Hicks' proposed final order. (Minute Entry, Add. Ex. 11, R. 408-10.) However, despite
its prior instructions in its Memorandum Decision for Hicks' counsel to "specifically
outline" the discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied and to "explain the basis" for the
court's decision that Hicks was purportedly denied the opportunity to present material
evidence, the trial court stated in its Minute Entry that the final order that "should be
simplified to reflect . . . in a general way, that the panel made certain discovery decisions
which resulted in [Hicks] being denied access to certain key witnesses and information
critical to his case."

(Id.at R. 408.)

As a result, the final order states that Hicks "was denied critical discovery; denied
the opportunity to present material evidence; and denied the opportunity to adequately
cross-examine witnesses, all of which substantially prejudiced Hicks' rights during the
arbitration proceeding." (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 1, at R. 41 1-12.) The trial court

never identified any specific discovery that Hicks was allegedly denied by the arbitration
panel. (See id.; see also Memorandum Decision, Add. Ex. 5.) Nor did the trial court
identify any instances in which the arbitrators prevented any testimony, excluded any
evidence or limited any cross-examination.

(Id.) Accordingly, the language contained in

the final order provides no guidance to an arbitration panel if the arbitration were to be
re-tried. (Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. I.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow in
scope, highly deferential to the arbitrators and limited to the statutory grounds for review.
A trial court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators.
Discovery matters, in particular, are left within the discretion of the arbitrators.
Here, the trial court committed plain error by vacating the Award on the sole basis
that it disagreed with the arbitrators' decision not to grant Hicks' request to depose
UBS7scustodian of records. Moreover, the trial court substituted its judgment for that of
the arbitrators with regard to a discovery dispute that was fully briefed and argued by the
parties during the arbitration and considered and resolved by the arbitrators.
The trial court's final order purports to provide three reasons for its decision in
stating that Hicks was: (i) "denied critical discovery"; (ii) "denied the opportunity to
present material evidence"; and (iii) "denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine
witnesses." However, the trial court did not apply any of these three reasons to the facts
of this case or even explain exactly what the arbitrators did (or did not do) that was

apparently so improper as to result in Hicks' rights being "substantially prejudiced." In
fact, the trial court's three purported reasons have no basis in the record.
As to the trial court's first reason, the purported denial of "critical discovery" is

not one of the statutorily-enumerated grounds on which an arbitration award can be
vacated. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides that an
arbitrator "may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is appropriate in the
circumstances."
Moreover, despite the more limited nature of discovery in FINRA arbitration, the
arbitrators went to great lengths to provide Hicks with access to all of the information he
sought. In fact, the arbitrators resolved Hicks' request for the deposition of UBS's
custodian of records

-

the only discovery that they denied Hicks

-

by ordering UBS to

produce all documents responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, to describe in an affidavit
its efforts to do so and to have the corporate representative who conducted UBS's search
for documents testify at the evidentiary hearing.
The trial court's second and third reasons for vacating the Award refer to Section
116 of the Utah Arbitration Act, which governs the manner in which arbitrators may

conduct a hearing.

Hicks, however, has never disputed the manner in which the

arbitrators conducted the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, although an arbitration award
may be vacated under the Act if a party is denied "the opportunity to present material
evidence" or "the opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses," the party seeking
to establish those grounds must show that its rights were "substantiallyprejudiced." The
trial court, however, failed to hold Hicks to that high standard. In fact, the trial court did

not identify a single instance in which the arbitrators prevented Hicks (or any other
witness) from testifying, excluded material evidence or limited cross-examination. That
is because the arbitrators never did any of these things. Accordingly, the trial court's
second and third reasons for vacating the Award are inapposite.
In short, the trial court vacated the Award for reasons that are impermissible,
unsubstantiated and inapplicable. Accordingly, UBS respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's order and judgment vacating the Award and direct that the Award
be confirmed and that judgment be entered in UBS's favor.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY EXERCISED ITS AUTHORITY IN
VACATING THE AWARD ON THE SOLE BASIS THAT THE ARBITRATORS DID NOT PERMIT HICKS TO DEPOSE UBS'S CUSTODIAN OF
RECORDS
This entire matter can be resolved by answering a single, straightforward legal

question: Whether an arbitration award may be vacated on the sole basis that the
arbitration panel did not allow the losing party to conduct certain discovery. Based on
the plain language of the Utah Arbitration Act, the answer is clearly "no."
When Hicks agreed to arbitrate any and all disputes with UBS, Hicks (and UBS)
willingly gave up the right to the sort of extensive discovery mechanisms that he could
have pursued in court. The trial court, however, refused to hold Hicks to this agreement
and vacated UBS's arbitration award against Hicks on the ground that the arbitrators did
not allow Hicks to depose UBS's custodian of records

-

despite the fact that both the

parties' arbitration agreement and the applicable arbitration rules expressly limit the

scope of discovery and did not require the panel to allow such a deposition, despite the
fact that this purported discovery issue was fully briefed and argued by the parties during
the arbitration and considered and resolved by the arbitrators and despite the fact that the
Utah Arbitration Act expressly leaves discovery matters within the discretion of the
arbitrators.
Even if the trial court disagreed with the arbitrators' discovery decisions, including
their decision not to allow Hicks to depose UBS7scustodian of records, that disagreement
is not a valid basis for vacating the Award. Under Section 124(1) of the Act, an
arbitration award may only be vacated if the party challenging the award establishes one
or more of the following:
(a)

the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

(b)

there was:
(i)

evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
arbitrator;

(ii)

corruption by an arbitrator; or

(iii)

misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party
to the arbitration proceeding;

(c)

an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing
contrary to Section 78B- 11-116, so as to substantially prejudice the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;

(d)

an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority;

(e)

there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in
the arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under
Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than the beginning of the

arbitration hearing; or
(f)

the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation
of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration
proceeding.

Utah Code Ann.
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78B-11-124(1). Section 124(1) does not include the trial court's

disagreement with an arbitrators' denial of a discovery request as a basis for vacating an
award.
The trial court attempted to get around this problem by stating that the arbitrators
"conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B- 11-116" and did not, as that section
provides, allow Hicks "to present evidence material to the controversy" and "to crossexamine witnesses appearing at the hearing." Even if those provisions were applicable to
the facts of this case (which they are not), in order to have the Award vacated, Hicks was
also required, pursuant to Section 124 of the Act, to show that his rights were

"substantiallyprejudiced." Although the trial court quotes this standard in its final order,
it fails to apply it to the facts of this case and fails to explain exactly what the arbitrators
did (or did not do) that was apparently so improper as to "substantially prejudice" Hicks'
rights.
In fact, Hicks was not denied the opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine
witnesses and his rights were not substantially prejudiced. There is absolutely nothing in
the record to suggest that the arbitrators prevented Hicks (or any other witness) from
testifying, excluded material evidence or limited cross-examination.

Despite the fact that Hicks submitted a proposed final order to the trial court
stating that the arbitrators had "denied him discovery materials that he never even
requested, the only discovery that the arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of
UBS7s custodian of records. (See [Proposed] Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 9, R. 38589; Objections to Proposed Order and Judgment, Add. Ex. 10, R. 377-83.) But having a
discovery request denied is not the same thing as being denied the right to present
evidence or cross-examine witnesses. Indeed, Section 116(4) applies only to the manner
in which the arbitrators may conduct a hearing and does not make any reference to
discovery matters or other pre-hearing proceedings. And it certainly does not bestow
upon a party to an arbitration an unfettered right to conduct discovery. When he joined
UBS as a Financial Advisor, Hicks expressly acknowledged and agreed that "[tlhe ability
of the parties to obtain documents, witness statements and other discovery is generally
more limited in arbitration than in court proceedings." (Add. Ex. 2 at R. 161.) Having
willingly agreed to forego more extensive discovery processes when he agreed to
arbitrate any and all disputes with UBS, Hicks is in no position now to complain that he
was not given all the discovery he wanted.
Moreover, another section of the Act makes it absolutely clear that the trial court's
disagreement with the arbitrators' denial of a discovery request is not a basis for vacating
an arbitration award. In fact, Section 118 of the Act expressly leaves it within the
arbitrators' & discretion to determine whether and to what extent discovery is to be
allowed:

An arbitrator may permit any discovery the arbitrator decides is
appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the
parties to the arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the
desirability of making the proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost-effective.
Utah Code Ann.

5 78B- 11-118(3) (emphasis added).

Section 118 thus clearly reflects the

Legislature's intent to leave discovery in the hands of the arbitrators, who, after all, are in
a much better position to determine what discovery is actually "appropriate" given the
facts and circumstances of the case before them.
If the arbitrators' denial of a discovery request were tantamount to the denial of a
party's right to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses under Section 116(4), and
thus a basis for vacating an award under Section 124(l)(c), then Section 118 would be
rendered meaningless. In interpreting statutes, however, a court's role is to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Dep't
of Corrections, 2001 UT 34,

7 15, 24 P.3d 958.

Moreover, in interpreting potentially

conflicting statutes, specific provisions take precedence over general provisions.

Id. The

trial court's apparent interpretation of Section 116(4) violates both of these important precepts.
The trial court committed plain error in violating the express provisions of the
Utah Arbitration Act and vacating the Award on the sole basis that the arbitrators did not
permit Hicks to depose UBS7scustodian of records. As there was no basis to vacate the
Award, it should be confirmed as a judgment.

11.

THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS IN THE RECORD FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT HICKS WAS DENIED
"CRITICAL DISCOVERY"
Even if the purported denial of "critical discovery" were a valid basis to vacate an

arbitration award, there was absolutely no basis in this case for the trial court to conclude
that the arbitrators denied Hicks "critical discovery." In fact, the trial court did not
identify any discovery that Hicks was purportedly denied. As the only discovery that the
arbitrators denied Hicks was the deposition of UBS7scustodian of records, one can only
assume that this is the sole basis on which the trial court vacated the

ward.'

The

arbitrators, however, were well within their authority in denying Hicks' request.
Consistent with Section 118 of the Utah Arbitration Act, FINRA's discovery rules
and arbitration guidelines provide that it is within the arbitrators' sole discretion to
determine, given the facts and circumstances before them, the nature and extent of
appropriate discovery. Indeed, FINRA's Arbitrator's Manual instructs the arbitrators to
carefully exercise their judgment when considering a party's request for depositions and
cautions them to bear in mind that arbitration should be efficient and expeditious:
The effective use of discovery tools such as depositions rests
in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care

5

Although the trial court stated, in its Memorandum Decision, that "the panel's
decision hindered [Hicks'] ability to present material evidence and his ability to
adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness in the arbitration
proceeding," the trial court never identified the "panel's decision" to which it referred,
never explained the basis for its decision that Hicks was denied material evidence (as it
indicated it would do in its final order) and never explained the basis for its decision that
Hicks, who examined Ms. Weisman as part of his case in chief, was hindered in his
ability to cross-examine her. (See Mem. Dec., Add. Ex. 5, R. 372-76; Order & Judgment,
Add. EX. 1, R. 411-12.)

should be taken to avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to
the parties and to avoid unnecessary delay.
See The Arbitrator's Manual, August 2007, at p. 12 (Add. Ex. 7).
Notably, there is no basis to conclude that Hicks was entitled to depose UBS's
custodian of records. On the contrary, FINRA7sCode of Arbitration Procedure ("CAP")
expressly states that depositions are "strongly discouraged" in FINRA arbitration.

See

FINRA CAP Rule 13510 (Add. Ex. 6) (emphasis added). In fact, FINRA arbitrators may
permit depositions only in "very limited'

circumstance^.^

Having considered the parties'

briefs and oral argument, the arbitrators determined that none of those circumstances
applied to Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records.
But the arbitrators went even further and resolved this purported "issue" by
providing Hicks with the information he sought by alternate means. In lieu of granting
Hicks' request to depose UBS's custodian of records, the arbitrators ordered UBS to
produce an Affirmation stating either that "there are no responsive documents or information" in response to Hicks' discovery requests or that UBS's previously produced
documents or information (which shall be itemized by name or description) constitute all
the responsive documents or information that was found after the required good faith
search." (R. 285-86.)

6

Under FINRA CAP 13510, depositions are allowed only to preserve the
testimony of ill or dying witnesses; To accommodate essential witnesses who are unable
or unwilling to travel long distances for a hearing and may not otherwise be required to
participate in the hearing; To expedite large or complex cases; or "[ilf the panel
determines that extraordinary circumstances exist." (Add. Ex. 6.)

In accordance with the arbitrators' order, UBS produced prior to the evidentiary
hearing an Affirmation detailing its efforts to search for documents and information
responsive to Hicks' discovery requests, identifying each category of documents that it
produced as a result of its search and stating that such documents constitute all of the
responsive d

ocuments that were found after the required good faith search. (Add. Ex. 8,

At the evidentiary hearing, Hicks moved the Affirmation into evidence and had
the opportunity to question any of UBS's witnesses about it. (Borrelli Aff. 7 2 1, R. 135.)
In fact, despite his claims to the trial court in support of his motion to vacate the Award,
Hicks questioned Virginia Weisman, the corporate representative who conducted UBS's
search for documents and executed the Affirmation, regarding, among other things,
UBS's document production.

(Id.7 32; Affirmation, R. 288-90.)

Accordingly, Hicks

received (or at least had access to) the very information that he claimed was denied him along with all of the other discovery and information to which the arbitrators provided
him access.
In short, not only did the trial court improperly vacate the Award on the basis of a
purported discovery issue, it substituted its judgment for that of the arbitrators with
respect to an issue that was considered, resolved and rendered moot by the arbitrators.
111.

UTAH'S STRONG PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
MANDATES THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
VACATING THE AWARD
Utah has a strong public policy mandate that liberally encourages arbitration

because it is expeditious and efficient. See, e.g., Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n of

Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Utah 1996) (Utah Arbitration Act "reflects long-standing
public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes").
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has instructed that trial courts should undertake
only an extremely narrow review of arbitration awards. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake
Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) (standard of review is "highly deferential to the
arbitrator"); see also Utility Trailer Sales v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987)
("[Jludicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or susceptible
to repetitive adjudications, but should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures
for

re vie^").^ Otherwise, "the speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms

would be greatly undermined." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947-48.
In accordance with these well-established principles, the Utah Arbitration Act
provides that discovery matters are left entirely within the arbitrators' discretion and that
an arbitration panel's denial of a party's discovery request is not a permissible ground on
which an arbitration award may be vacated. See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947-48 ("the trial
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or
vacate an award because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment").
Allowing an arbitration award to be vacated because the losing party was denied
discovery would defeat the important, legislatively-enacted purpose of arbitration as a
speedy and inexpensive means to resolve disputes. Indeed, any arbitration award could

7

The United States Supreme Court recently held that, under the Federal
Arbitration Act, arbitration awards are not subject to general review for an arbitrator's
, 128 S.Ct. 1396
legal errors. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
(2008).

be vacated upon the losing party's expost facto claim that he should have been entitled to
conduct additional discovery and that such additional discovery was important to his
case. At a minimum, a great number of arbitration awards would become subject to
detailed, time-consuming, and expensive judicial review.
This why the law is so clear in providing that arbitration awards are subject to only
limited judicial review and that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the
arbitrators. Otherwise, the whole point of arbitration would be lost.
The Tenth Circuit recognized this in a case involving similar facts as the case at
bar. In Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 847 F.2d 63 1, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1988),
the district court affirmed an arbitration award ordering securities brokers, who resigned
to join a competitor, to repay their employee forgivable loans. Like the district court, the
Tenth Circuit refused to second-guess the arbitrators' determinations:
[Tlhe sole question for our consideration is whether the
arbitration panel ignored the plain language of the contract in
refusing [the brokers'] interpretation of the agreement . . . .
But this is a review of an arbitration award. [The brokers]
agreed to have an arbitration panel interpret their contracts.
Even if the panel misread the contract, we may not reverse for
that reason alone. The court cannot say that the panel ignored
the plain language of the contract, and the district court's
decision must therefore be affirmed.

Id.at 635 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in this case, the parties agreed to have an arbitration panel adjudicate all
of their disputes, claims and controversies. They also agreed that the arbitration panel
would determine the nature and extent of discovery and expressly acknowledged that
such discovery would be more limited in arbitration. Even if it disagreed with the

arbitrators' determination of a discovery issue, the trial court should not have vacated the
arbitration award on that basis.

Accordingly, the trial court's order and judgment

vacating the Award should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Arbitration Act provides specific grounds on which an arbitration award
may be vacated. A trial court's disagreement with an arbitration panel's determination
and resolution of a discovery dispute is not one of them. On the contrary, the Act
provides that discovery matters should be left within the sole discretion of the arbitrators.
Even if it were a valid ground for vacating the Award (which it is not), there was
absolutely no basis in the record for the trial court to conclude that Hicks was denied
"critical discovery." Nor was there any basis whatsoever in the record to conclude that
the arbitrators denied Hicks "the opportunity to present material evidence" or "the
opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses," much less that Hicks' rights were

"substantiallyprejudiced."
In connection with its review of the Award, the trial court completely reversed the
parties' respective burdens. The trial court did not require Hicks, the party seeking to
vacate the Award, to demonstrate any of the statutorily-enumerated grounds for vacating
the Award. Instead, UBS was essentially forced to show that such grounds did not exist.
In short, the trial court incorrectly exercised its authority by failing to give
appropriate deference to the arbitrators and by vacating the Award for reasons that are
impermissible, unsubstantiated and inapplicable. Accordingly, UBS respectfully requests
that this Court:

(i)

Reverse the trial court's order and judgment denying UBS's motion
for summary confirmation of the Award;

(ii)

Reverse the trial court's order and judgment granting Hicks' petition
to vacate the Award; and

(iii)

Direct that the Award be confirmed and that Judgment be entered
pursuant to the Award in UBS's favor and against Hicks in the
amount of $575,436.28, plus pre-judgment interest, post-judgment
interest, costs, and attorney fees as allowed by contract and by Utah
Code Ann. 5 78B-11-126.
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